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child-killing, assault, and larceny. The treatment of some of these is
quite interesting, and of others is quite disappointing.
It is a pity that the collection does not include a discussion of the
present English law and administrative experience with respect to the de-
tention and interrogation of arrested persons prior to arraignment, and
of the British conception and administrative implementation of an ac-
cused's privilege to have counsel. A thorough examination of these
topics would have filled in important gaps in the literature, and have
been of special interest to the authors' colleagues in the United States.
Perhaps the most interesting of those included is Dr. Radzinowicz's
on "International Collaboration in Criminal Science". He reviews the
two great movements towards collaboration-the first beginning in 1872
with the work of the International Prison Commission and the Union
Internationale de Droit Penal, interrupted by the outbreak of World
War I; and that initiated thereafter through the International Penal and
Prison Commission, in which the League of Nations eventually played a
part. Once again we have been interrupted by war, and it is time to re-
sume. Dr. Radziof6wicz's informed account of accomplishment and fail-
ure in our earlier attempts at international collaboration for the advance-
ment of criminal science is particularly useful, coming at this time.
GEORGE H. DassioN*
CHIEF JUSTICE STONE AND THE SuPRpmE COURT. By SAMUEL J.
KONEFSKY, With a Prefatory Note by Charles A. Beard. New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1945. Pp. xxvi, 290. $3.00.
Realizing that the higher one goes in the judicial hierarchy the
more judicial doctrine tends to become subjective jurisprudence, and
that the Supreme Court is a highly organized political body, the author,
a teacher of political science, essays in minor degree by a number of
articles the task of giving the public a profile of Chief Justice Stone's
contribution to constitutional doctrine. Preceded by an informative
personal note from Charles A. Beard, the Dean of American historians,
the profile is presented in the light of a few leading doctrines which,
while fundamental, do not do complete justice to Chief Justice Stone's
magnificent contributions. The author is of course less interested in
the Chief Justice's personality than in the constitutional views which are
expressed in his many opinions. Also, he is more interested in the Chief
Justice's conceptions of the judicial function than in the particular deci-
sions the Chief Justice has written. The author notes, for example, the
frequency with which Mr. Justice Stone's dissenting opinions became
in a later day the majority opinion of the Court. The Chief Justice
is distinguished by a certain prophetic vision of the direction in which
public policy is likely to go, and for that reason must have felt himself
at home when the five conservatives of the pre-1936 days became grad-
ually a dissenting minority, and the dissenters of those days, led by
Holmes, Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo, represented the prevailing ma-
jority.
This cannot altogether be attributed to the fact that a single Pres-
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ident appointed the majority of the existing Court. They have been
good appointments because of the flexibility of their orientation. But
their methods reflect a departure from the old days of deciding eases
by maxims, cliches and labels; they present a solid reason for their view
of law and policy.
Mr. Konef sky has written an interesting book. It is hard to lay it
down. He observes, for example, that the Chief Justice in an early day
realized the modest place that courts should occupy in our constitu-
tional processes, giving to legislatures and to states the benefit of any
doubt. Yet in civil liberties cases, Justice Stone has, in the company
of the Court, with the exception of the logical and able Justice Frank-
furter, departed from this premise and substituted the Court's view
of civil liberties for the legislative judgment. While it is true that the
Suprere Cotirt cannot produce tolerance in this country, it exercises
so latge an influence upon states and local communities that its ad-
vanced views have done much to preserve civil liberties throughout the
United States. The Chief Justice is also, probably by virtue of his
early training, a strong analyst of the facts and believes that the com-
mon law and :constitutional law pursue the same methods of judicial
empiricism. It must have afforded the Chief Justice geat personal
gratification to convert his lone dissent in the Gobitis case to the ma-
jority view in the West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette2
case a few years later.
Perhaps what most distinguishes the present Chief Justice -is 'not
alone his learning and ability but his profound fund of common sense
and a sense of -humor, which have endeared him to the entire bar. The
reviewer ventures to believe that his fine company in personal relations
is not the least of his talents. The kindliness of his personality is some-
what concealed by the picture which adorns the cover of the January
Ainericag Bar Association Journal.
The author's first chapter deals with the growth of the doctrine of
intergovernmental immunity from taxation, and shows the" gradual
prevalence of the Chief Justice's views of the wide range of the taxing
power existing in both governments. Yet his ability to abstain from
falling under the sway of generalizations is well illustrated in the
Saratoga Springs decisi6n, State of New York et al. 'v. United States.3
This has been handed down since the book under review was written.
The Chief Justice draws the line at federal taxation 'of instrumentalities
which really affect the state in its sovereign prerogatives. He dissipates
the old distinction between governmental and corporate powers.
In his second chapter, on the commerce clause and state power, the
author works out the development of the clause and its effect in enlarg-
ing federal power. He shows how this was achievted and pays tribute
to the majority justices who'accomplished the result. The Chief Justice
played a major part in this development.
The third chapter deals with the scope of the federal spending
power and the power over industrial conditions, in which again the
1. Minesville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. 'S. 586 (1940).
2. 319 U. S. 624 (1943).
3. 66 Sup. Ct 310 (1946).
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Chief Justice, if not a pioneer, at least took a leading part in dissipating
some of the old prejudices. The opinion of Justice Roberts in the
Butler4 case comes in for special condemnation. The welfare clause is
competently analyzed to show the breadth of the federal power of ap-
propriating money. The development of the power of government to
place limits on laissez faire in business and yet to draw the appropriate
line between freedom and regulation is well presented.
The fourth chapter deals with restraining the administrative proc-
ess and shows the extent to which the Chief Justice would give scope to
that process and the limited function and great self-restraint he would
impose on the courts. Yet the "substantial evidence" rule enables the
courts to do anything they want to. Here again the modern court played
a vital part in sustaining those industrial and governmental functions
which the Congress anticipated. The Chief Justice tilted with the
earlier Court in contending that price fixing was as much an incident of
business regulation as any other police power function, a view which
finally prevailed, though economically speaking this interference with
natural laws doubtless has a limitation iii time.
The fifth chapter is entitled "'Censoring' State Regulation of Eco-
nomic Activities". In the struggle for minimum wages for women,
which has finally received the green light, the Chief Justice played a
powerful part, first as a dissenter, then as the concurring Justice for
the majority. So with his work in sustaining unemployment compensa-
tion legislation. Business was deemed by Justice Stone subject to pub-
lic control whenever circumstances required, and he may have initiated
the abolition of the old label "business affected with a public interest".
The sixth chapter is devoted to the Chief Justice's contribution to
the maintenance of civil liberties. He early took the view that the bur-
den of proof in economic relations is on the one who contests constitu-
tionality, whereas in civil liberties the burden of proof is shifted. Under
the head of "Protecting the Political Process" the author analyzes the
Hague5 case and the. Classic6 case very effectively. Able, also, is his dis-
cussion under the head of "Guardian of Liberty", of the many Je-
hovah's Witnesses cases, in which the Chief Justice has finally made
his view prevail.
About the. section on civil and military. relations there will doubt-
less be much controversy for some time. Here the Chief Justice has
pretty regularly sustained the military power which the dissenting opin-
ions of Justices Murphy and Rutledge in the Yamashit7 case would
place under the constant supervision of the due process clause. The
Hirabayashi8 decision is very disappointing, to say the least. The dis-
possessed nationals if not the aliens should be compensated.
The leitmotif of the work perhaps is presented in the last chapter,
entitled "An Enlightened View of the Judicial Function". The Chief
4. 297 U. S. 1 (1936.).
5. Hague v, C. 1. 0., 307.U. S. 496 (1939).
6. United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941).
7. General Tomoyuki Yamashita v. Lt Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer, 66 Sup. Ct. 340
(decided February 4, 1946).
8. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 (1943).,
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Justice's realization of the importance of judicial self-restraint has en-
hanced the reputation of the Court beyond all previous levels. It is
trite to say that to that distinguished eminence the present Chief Justice
has made a mighty contribution.
Minor errors that have *been noted, such as the use of the word
"reversed" for "overruled" (page 132), the failure to cite the Olsen9
case (p. 174), and the typographical error of "off" for "of" (p. 203),
do not detract from the value of the present sketch. It leaves unmen-
tioned some of the Chief Justice's important contributions, such as the
fact that he overcame the unfortunate dictum in the Willing0 case and
established for a unanimous court the constitutionality of the declara-
tory action in Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace,"- and
that his dissent in the Pink'2 case is entitled to major credence and
weight. EDWIN BORCHARD*
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, Vol. I-Intro-
duction: Family Law. By ERNST R,_BEL. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press; Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1945. Pp. lvi, 745.
The very apt foreword provided for this treatise by the American
Law Institute's William Draper Lewis, supplemented by able Prof es-
sor Yntema, leaves little excuse, perhaps, for a review. Their account of
the author's background, their exposition of the necessity for "compara-
tive" studies in Conflicts, and their laudatory, yet deserved and unexag-
gerated, appraisal of Rabel's present contribution permit scarcely more
than a chorus of "Aiiens" and "Well-dones" on the part of the re-
viewers of this book.
One considering "comparative" studies in Conflicts is hard put to
resist the temptation to elaborate upon the necessity, especially in an age
which is "One World" conscious, of seeking an understanding know-
ledge of our neighbors' viewpoints. Although Dr. Rabel makes little di-
rect comment on that score, the reader cannot fail to strengthen his con-
victions on the matter as a result of the mere recital of the diversity of
world views; the bare realities inherent in the problems presented are, in
themselves, far more eloquent than rhetorical exhortations by reviewers
to stress the importance of continued "comparative" studies.
I have set off the word "comparative" because I think the term, and
to that extent the title of Rabel's book, is in one sense inappropriate. In
a suit involving purely "internal" application of so-called "substantive'"
rules, as in a tort, criminal, or contract case having no foreign elements,
comparative considerations of foreign law, while useful, interesting and
commendable, are not indispensable or inescapable. But in a case involv-
ing foreign elements, the foreign rules prevailing at the "domicil" or
"locus" of the case, including Conflict of Law rules, become intrinsically
9. Olsen v. State of Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313
U, S. 236 (1941).
10. Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U. S. 274 (1928).
11. 288 U. S. 249 (1933).
12. United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942).
* Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale University School of
Law.
HeinOnline  -- 46 Colum. L. Rev.  337 1946
